The moral problem can be formalised as an inconsistent triad between cognitivism, internalism and the Humean theory of motivation and emotion. Cognitivism is the view that moral judgements are truth apt beliefs about the world. In this view, it is possible under certain circumstances that a moral judgement can be considered as a fact in much the same way as the sentence “Moscow is the capital of Russia” is a fact. Smith’s view of how moral judgements motivate the individuals that agree with them falls into the internalist view of motivation. Internalism holds that motivation is a fundamental property of moral judgements. A moral judgement is only valid if it necessarily motivates agents who believe in them to act. The view that a moral judgement is both truth-apt and necessarily motivating becomes incoherent while holding to the view that beliefs cannot by themselves motivate action taken from the Humean theory of motivation and emotion (Hume, as cited in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2024). Hume’s theory holds that action is brought about by the combination of beliefs and motivations. If I believe there’s orange juice in the fridge and I’m thirsty, I’ll drink it. But if I’m not thirsty, knowing it’s there won’t make me drink it. Likewise, if I’m thirsty but don’t know there’s juice, my desire alone won’t lead me to act.
If cognitivism is true then moral judgements are beliefs. If the Humean theory of motivation and emotions is also true, then beliefs cannot motivate action. This seems to disqualify the internalist notion that moral judgements motivate actions. Smith’s solution to this is to maintain moral realism by holding onto cognitivism and internalism and rethinking the Humean theory of motivation and emotion. He does this by distinguishing between desires in a broad sense and so-called idealised desires, those which an agent would desire in a well-informed, rational, ideal state of mind, free from biases, hidden motives and impulses. The distinction can be outlined in a simple example. John is approached by a disagreeable colleague named Julie and accused of leaving an unwashed coffee mug in the sink of their shared kitchen. John realises that the coffee cup actually belongs to Julie. At this moment, John experiences a desire to vocally expose Julie’s mistake causing her embarrassment. This is a standard desire. The kind in which Hume would describe as a “slave of the passions” (Hume, as cited in James, 2019) and not necessarily connected to any rationality. By contrast, an idealised desire would result from a state of mind that is rational, well-informed, and uninfluenced by biases, irrational desires and impulses. In this state of mind, the individual would likely react to their accuser by maintaining professionalism, calmly informing them that they are mistaken and not indulge in belligerent or hubristic behaviour.
Smith argues that moral judgements are beliefs about what we would do if we were in an ideal state of mind. In doing so, he appears to have resolved the tension between cognitivism and internalism by revising the Humean view that beliefs cannot motivate. The judgement “In an ideal state of mind, I would not desire to steal” is truth-apt in that it can be argued to be either true or not true and by specifying “In an ideal state of mind” it expresses the conditions in which one would be necessarily motivated to not steal.
The problem I see with Smith’s solution stems from his view that moral judgements can be considered moral fact. In Smith’s view, when separate moral agents reasoning under ideal conditions (fully rational, informed, and free from bias) converge on the same moral judgement, their convergence reflects a moral fact.
In A.J. Ayer’s critique of ethics, moral judgements cannot reflect real facts about the world because moral terms like ‘good’, and ‘wrong’ cannot be connected to any real property of the world. Ayer suggests that moral judgements are expressions of how one feels about a certain action. To say that stealing is wrong essentially only means to express that one does not like stealing. Smith’s view of moral judgements appear more like expressions of emotion than facts. This becomes apparent when I compare moral judgements with true facts. A true fact stands firm under attacks of scepticism. When the same scepticism is applied to moral judgements, their validity can invariably be brought into question.
Consider the following three facts.
- 2 + 2 = 4.
In order for me to doubt this fact, it requires an extreme form of Cartesian scepticism.
- Moscow is the capital of Russia.
While this fact is easier to doubt than the previous fact, there is still little reason to be sceptical about this fact.
- ‘Stealing is wrong’ as converged upon by moral agents thinking under ideal conditions.
There are readily apparent reasons for me to be sceptical of this judgement, even if I am thinking under ideal conditions. I can imagine a scene where a powerful malevolent force is in possession of the cure to a horrible disease. If this were true, I would have reason to doubt that “stealing is wrong” is a fact.
There is a fundamental difference between the first two facts, and the moral judgement. It is only possible to doubt the first two facts using extreme and sophisticated scepticism, whereas the moral judgement is highly vulnerable to attacks of scepticism, even to attacks made with tongue in cheek. This vulnerability is present in all moral judgements as there is always the possibility to formulate similar counter situations where a specific moral judgement is deemed inappropriate. True rigorous facts can only be toppled by titans like Descartes’ mighty demon. For moral judgements however, only the devil’s advocate is needed.
Moral judgements can be more easily compared to expressions of emotions than to facts. There is always an expression of emotion implicit in every moral judgement. “Stealing is wrong” can be interpreted as “Boo stealing” and “you should donate to charity” can be seen as “Hooray charity” Even the most rigorous rational imperatives are not exempt from this rule. There is no moral judgement that cannot be seen as an expression of emotion.
Since moral judgements are fundamentally different from true facts, and are always expressions of emotion, I conclude that moral judgements are not facts and are expressions of emotion. Smith might have found a logical compatibility between cognitivism, internalism and Hume’s theory of motivation and emotion; he fails to solidify his position as moral realism.
Bibliography
Ayer, A.J. “A Critique of Ethics.” In Ethical Theory: An Anthology, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, 17-23. 2nd ed. Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons, 2012.
Michael Smith, “Realism,” in Ethical Theory: An Anthology, 2nd ed., ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons, 2012), 246-260.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. “Emotions in 17th and 18th Century Philosophy.” Accessed September 22, 2024. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotions-17th18th/LD8Hume.html.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. “Skepticism.” Accessed September 22, 2024. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/.