The following essay analyses Schopenhauer’s worldview and determines how it constitutes the notion of the self, and what capacity it has for an understanding of rationality. The essay argues that Schopenhauer conceives of the self as both representation and Will simultaneously, while rationality occupies a limited and subordinate role as a means through which the activities of Will are pursued.
The first aspect of Schopenhauer’s system is an account of the world as representation. Schopenhauer’s conception of representation follows Kant’s phenomenal realm insofar as everything experienced exists as an object in relation to a knowing subject and is conditioned by forms supplied by that subject, which can be known a priori as conditions for the possibility of experience (Schopenhauer 1969, §1).
Also like Kant, Schopenhauer understands the world as it exists independently of representation in terms of the thing-in-itself. Unlike Kant, however, Schopenhauer argues that some things can be known about the thing-in-itself. First, since space and time belong only to the realm of representation, distinctions between individual things that depend upon space and time likewise belong only to representation. Schopenhauer therefore argues that plurality and individuality are features of representation and cannot belong to the thing-in-itself. Since the thing-in-itself exists outside space and time, and therefore outside the possibility of plurality, it must instead be one and indivisible (Schopenhauer 1969, §23).
Additionally, Schopenhauer claims that through our bodies, we can understand the thing-in-itself as Will: the second aspect of Schopenhauer’s systemic worldview. For Schopenhauer, our bodies provide us with insight into the nature of the thing-in-itself since the body is understood by us in two distinct ways simultaneously: externally as an object of representation and internally through our immediate experience of willing (Schopenhauer 1969, §18). Schopenhauer characterises this Will as a blind and non-rational striving, manifested in human beings through instinctual drives and desires. Will has no ultimate aim or purpose; it is a persistent striving that presents as a continuity of new desires and impulses without any final point of satisfaction (Wicks 2003, §4). For Schopenhauer, our understanding of Will is not limited to merely our own bodies. Since the body does not differ fundamentally from other objects as representation, Schopenhauer argues that the nature of Will disclosed through our bodies also applies to all other objects. He therefore identifies Will as the inner nature of those objects as well (Schopenhauer 1969, §19).
Since Schopenhauer identifies Will with the thing-in-itself, the unity he attributes to the thing-in-itself also applies to Will such that Will is one and indivisible reality despite appearing through a plurality of individual beings (Schopenhauer 1969, §23). When the Will manifests into individual beings however, each apparent individual strives according to their own particular drives and desires. In this sense, Will can be understood as engaging with itself as its separate manifestations pursue ends that can only be achieved at the expense of others. As such, the Will essentially must compete with, and consume itself (Janaway 1989, 253).
For Schopenhauer, the primacy is Will such that the entirety of organisms, including their bodily structure, drives and actions, all amount to manifestations of Will. This means that particular drives such as hunger and sexual desire are expressions of the Will, but so are the physical structures that bring about the fulfillment of those desires. The digestive system, for example, is structured towards the satisfaction of hunger, while the reproductive organs correspond to the sexual drive.The organism is therefore not merely an instrument through which Will pursues its drives, but is itself the expression of those drives in the world of representation. In this sense, the organism in its entirety can be understood as Will objectified in represented form (Janaway 1989, 255).
Within Schopenhauer’s system, the self can be understood as the point at which Will and representation coincide in one embodied individual. As representation, the self is a necessary condition of experience itself: every object exists only in relation to a knowing subject (Schopenhauer 1969, §2). As Will, the self is fundamentally a willing and striving being, whose bodily actions, drives and desires are manifestations of the same underlying Will that constitutes reality itself. Since this conception of the self involves the blind, striving and non-rational activities of Will at a fundamental level, questions about the possibility and limitations of rationality within the individual self naturally follow.
As Janaway points out, Will can sufficiently account for animal behaviour independently of rationality insofar as animals can pursue the demands of their will-to-life without rationally ever entering the picture. When a baby sea turtle emerges from the nest and immediately moves towards the ocean, it does not do so according to a rational deliberation that it must reach the ocean in order to survive; its movement towards the ocean is an instinctive expression of its underlying will to life (Janaway 1989, 250-252).
Since Will is the primary driving force underlying all living beings, including both humans and sea turtles, rationality can only be understood as subordinate to Will. In the case of human beings, rationality emerges as a means through which the ends of the will to life are pursued more effectively by enabling individuals to deliberate about how their drives and desires can be satisfied (Janaway 1989, 257-258). In this sense, rationality produces a more sophisticated form of willing, allowing human beings to consider consequences, compare strategies and select between alternative courses of action. Despite the sophistication of human rationality, it still remains subordinate to the more fundamental activity of willing.
An interesting implication of Schopenhauer’s system is that the entirety of philosophical thought is itself fundamentally the byproduct of the striving activities of a blind, irrational Will. This is especially interesting when contrasted with the understanding of how philosophical thought emerges according to Hegel. For Hegel, philosophical thought arises through the progressive development of reason towards increasing self-understanding, driven by overcoming the contradictions and inadequacies encountered within its existing form (Redding 2025, §3.1.1–3.1.2). Their respective accounts for the emergence of philosophy are essentially opposites: for Hegel, philosophy is pulled by reason’s tendency towards greater self-understanding, while for Schopenhauer, reason and philosophical thought are ultimately pushed forward by the blind striving of Will.
References:
Janaway, C 1989, Self and world in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Redding, Paul. 2025. ‘Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, revised 19 September 2025, accessed 22 September 2026, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hegel/.
Schopenhauer, A 1969, The world as will and representation, vol. 1, trans. EFJ Payne, Dover Publications, New York.
Wicks, R 2003, ‘Arthur Schopenhauer’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, accessed 20 September 2026, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schopenhauer/